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Couick: Professional Responsibility

PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
I.

DISCIPLINE FOR ATTORNEY MISCONDUCT

In three recent disciplinary proceedings, In re Belser,1 In re

Holman,2 and In re Treacy,3 the South Carolina Supreme Court
reaffirmed its intolerance of attorney misconduct and reasserted
its authority to mete out sanctions against attorneys unrestricted by the recommendations of the Hearing Panel and
Executive Committee of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline.4 Holman involved charges of misconduct
stemming from the attorney's conviction for contempt of court.'
Belser and Treacy involved inadequate preparation and case
neglect. Specifically, Belser was charged with violations of Disciplinary Rule (DR) 6-101(A)(2) and (3), and Treacy was charged
with violations of DR 6-101(A)(3).e
The action against Holman, grounded in sections 5B, 5C
and 6 of the Rule on Disciplinary Procedure,7 arose from his
conviction for contempt of court for communicating with a
venireman. The supreme court found that Holman's communication with a prospective juror fell within the "definition of a
1. 277 S.C. 250, 287 S.E.2d 139 (1982).
2. 277 S.C. 293, 286 S.E.2d 148 (1982).
3. 277 S.C. 514, 290 S.E.2d 240 (1982).
4. The leading case on this issue is Burns v. Clayton, 237 S.C. 316, 117 S.E.2d 300
(1960), where the supreme court held that its review of reports of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline is not a criminal proceeding nor an appeal from the
judgment of an inferior court. The court found that the Board's report is advisory only
and that it was not bound to accept.the Board's findings of fact nor concur in its recommended sanction. 237 S.C. at 331, 339, 117 S.E.2d at 307, 311-12.
5. Brief for Complainant at 2.
6. South Carolina adopted the MODEL CODE OF PROFESsSoNAL RESPONsiamrry effective January 1, 1970. S.C. Sup. CT. R. 32, DR 6-101(A)(Supp. 1981). DR 6-101(A)
provides:
(A) A Lawyer shall not:
(1) Handle a legal matter which he knows or should know that he is
not competent to handle, without associating with him a lawyer who is
competent to handle it.
(2) Handle a legal matter without preparation adequate in the
circumstances.
(3) Neglect a legal matter entrusted to him.
7. S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P., §§ 5B, 5C, 6 (Supp. 1981).
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'serious crime'" as contained in paragraph 2(N) of the Rule on
Disciplinary Procedure,8 and held that disbarment was the appropriate sanction. In so holding, the court refused to adopt the
unanimous recommendation of the Hearing Panjel and Executive
Committee 9 for an indefinite suspension of the respondent's
right to practice.10
Holman emphasizes the court's aggressive stance in cases
involving misconduct during the judicial process. As the court
noted in Burns v. Clayton,1 subornation of perjury, tampering
with witnesses or any other means of deceiving a court through
fraudulent devices are instances of gross misconduct which result in the obstruction of justice and therefore warrant disbarment. 12 The court's rejection, without dissent, of the Panel and
Committee's recommendation demonstrates that when an attorney's misconduct is so egregious as to obstruct the judicial process, the court will impose only the severest punishment.
The action against Belser arose out of a foreclosure action
in which the respondent represented one of the defendants. A
continuance in the action was granted because Belser erroneously believed that he had to appear before the supreme court
on the original date set for the hearing, but Belser failed to ap-

8. 277 S.C. at 294, 286 S.E.2d at 149.
9. The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline is appointed by the
South Carolina Supreme Court and consists of members of the bar from each judicial
circuit, equal to the number of circuit judges in each respective circuit. S.C. SuP. CT. R.
Disc. P. § 3(a)(Supp. 1981). The court then designates one member to serve as Chairman
of the Board. Id. at § 3(b). Of the remaining members, the Chairman recommends and
the supreme court appoints four members who with the Chairman comprise the Executive Committee. Id. at § 4(A). The Hearing Panel consists of three non-Executive Committee members of the Board, chosen by the Chairman to hear complaints. Id. at § 2(G).
10. 277 S.C. at 294, 286 S.E.2d at 149.
11. 237 S.C. 316, 117 S.E.2d 300 (1960).
12. Id., at 334 S.E.2d at 309. Although the court in Burns made a finding of "serious
misconduct," it refused to disbar respondent, citing the recent enactment of the Rules on
Disciplinary Procedure. The court in subsequent cases has used disbarment in similar
situations. Seg In re Caskey, 276 S.C. 410, 279 S.E.2d 129 (1981); In re Rish, 273 S.C.
365, 256 S.E.2d 540 (1979); In re Van Winter, 273 S.C. 156, 255 S.E.2d 347 (1979). Similar measures have also been used in other jurisdictions. See People v. Petrie, 642 P.2d
519 (Colo. 1982) (Colorado attorney's conviction for felony theft warranted suspension for
one year); Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Spector, 443 A.2d 965 (Md.
1982) (conviction for bribery resulted in disbarment); In re Scacchetti, 449 N.Y.S.2d 106
(1982)(disbarment for conviction of interference with commerce by extortion); In re Fortun, 97 Wash. 2d 240, 643 P.2d 447 (1982)(growing and processing of large quantity of
marijuana was sufficient for disbarment).
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pear at the subsequent hearing. Belser then made false statements in his exceptions to the Master's findings and failed to
serve those exceptions on opposing counsel. Belser abandoned
these exceptions after opposing counsel informed him of their
falsity.1"
The Panel found that Belser had not knowingly made false
statements in his exceptions, that he did not intentionally fail to
serve opposing counsel with the exceptions, and that he had
abandoned his exceptions in a timely manner during his appearance before the circuit court. 14 The Committee unanimously
adopted the Panel's recommendation that the complaint be dismissed and a letter of caution be issued requiring Belser to familiarize himself with the Rules of Practice of the Circuit Courts
15
of South Carolina.
The supreme court, Justices Harwell and Gregory dissenting, rejected the recommendation of the Panel and Committee
and held that Belser should be publicly reprimanded. The court
found that the attorney's lack of knowledge of the rules of practice in South Carolina courts warranted such censure. 6 In disapproving the Committee's suggestion that a letter of caution be
issued, the court noted that there were only four permissible
sanctions: disbarment, indefinite suspension, public reprimand,
7
and private reprimand.'
The action against Treacy arose from his negligent handling
of a foreclosure action. Treacy was paid a fee of $500.00 to recover excessive sums paid by his client to the mortgagor. The
respondent did not take any action to recover the money nor did
he return any of the fee paid to him by his client. 8
In rejecting the Panel and Committee's recommendation
that a public reprimand be issued, the supreme court emphasized Treacy's refusal to cooperate with the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline in the investigation of the
complaint. Specifically, Treacy did not respond to four separate
attempts by the Board to investigate the incident. 9 He eventu-

13. 277 S.C. at 251, 287 S.E.2d at 139.

14. Brief for Complainant at 1.
15. Id. at 12.
16. 277 S.C. at 251, 287 S.E.2d at 139.

17. Id., 287 S.E.2d at 139.
18. Id. at 514-15, 290 S.E.2d at 240-41.
19. Id. at 516-17, 290 S.E.2d at 240-41.
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ally supplied information to the Board, but it was wholly inadequate. When additional documentation was requested he failed
to provide it.20 The respondent also failed to appear before the
supreme court at the designated time and place and filed an excuse with the clerk of court after the hearing had been held. The
supreme court, Justice Harwell dissenting, indefinitely suspended Treacy from the practice of law.2
Belser and Treacy are important to practicing attorneys in
South Carolina for several reasons.2 First, the court in Belser
refused to recognize the use of a letter of caution. Second,
Treacy alerts practitioners to the court's continued intolerance
of attorney conduct which is contrary to the fiduciary nature of
the attorney-client relationship. Finally, the complainant's briefs
for Belser, Treacy, and Holman emphasize the cooperative roles
of the Panel, Committee, and Attorney General's office. Of note
is the aggressive role the Attorney General has taken to bolster
respect for the disciplinary system. Relying upon the supreme
court's ability to deliver sanctions which are independent of the
Committee's recommendation, the Attorney General, as complainant, has vigorously prosecuted violators of the procedural
as well as the substantive content of the rules.
For its part, the South Carolina Supreme Court in Belser,
Holman, and Treacy has demonstrated a marked intolerance of
attorney misconduct. These decisions clearly indicate that the
court will not be bound by the recommendations of the Hearing
Panel and Executive Committee, but will impose such sanctions
as it deems appropriate.
Michael Couick

20. Brief for Complainant at 5.
21. 277 S.C. at 518, 290 S.E.2d at 242.
22. For other jurisdictions' treatment of similar charges, see Walker v. Supreme
Court of Arkansas Committee on Professional Conduct, 628 S.W.2d 552 (Ark. 1982)(neglectful conduct regarding interests of client warranted letter of caution); Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Heinze, 442 A.2d 570 (Md. 1982)(public censure issued
for failure to adequately pursue client's claim); In re Loew, 642 P.2d 1171 (Or. 1981)(neglect of entrusted legal matter and misrepresentation to client concerning status of case
resulted in 30-day suspension).
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